This paper develops a tractable model with two-dimensional asymmetric information in asset markets: sellers are privately informed about their asset quality and distress positions. Illiquidity arises endogenously and manifests itself through two distinct market outcomes. The …rst outcome features limited market participation, resulting in a dry-up in trading volume. The second outcome involves a large volume at a depressed price. Only in the latter outcome do distressed sellers engage in …re-sales, quickly unwinding their positions at a steep price discount. The paper further establishes that this equilibrium can arise only when buyers expect that sellers with a higher need for immediacy will on average have higherquality assets. Hence, both the information structure and the distribution of sellers'distress are crucial for the existence of …re-sales.
Introduction
This paper proposes an information-based theory to explain a variety of illiquidity patterns in asset markets. It considers two-dimensional asymmetric information: sellers are privately informed about the quality of their assets as well as their distress positions. 1 While, starting from Akerlof (1970) , it is well known that adverse selection can lead to illiquidity in …nancial markets, the main contribution of this framework is to show how various information structures and market conditions can lead to di¤erent types of equilibria, generating two distinct notions of illiquidity.
The …rst outcome results in a dry-up in trading volume, which implies that distressed sellers have to hold on to their assets longer. 2 By contrast, the second outcome implies a high trading volume at a depressed price, in which distressed sellers sell quickly at a steep discount (i.e., a "…re sale").
To capture explicitly both aspects of market liquidity-price and trading rate-as well as traders'di¤erent incentives, I allow sellers and buyers to sort themselves optimally into di¤erent submarkets. Each submarket is characterized by a pair of price and trading rate, which endogenously depends on the composition of sellers and the resulting buyer-seller ratio in that market. 3 Without informational friction, each asset with a positive gain from trade will be sold at the price that re ‡ects the asset fundamental and at the optimal trading rate (i.e., at an optimal level of participation). I therefore de…ne liquidity distortion as the deviation from the …rst-best outcome of the selling price and the trading rate.
I establish that the market outcome crucially depends on buyers'perceptions of sellers'trading motives. To be precise, the value of immediacy to a seller can be understood as his marginal rate of substitution between prices and trading rates, which depends on both the asset quality (common value component) and distress position (private value component). Recognizing sellers' incentives, buyers, on the other hand, only value the asset quality. The interaction of sellers'incentives and buyers'willingness to pay thus leads to di¤erent market segmentation and liquidity distortion.
Speci…cally, while the trading rate can naturally be used as a mechanism to separate sellers with di¤erent needs for immediacy, I show that a fully separating mechanism can emerge if and only if the underlying distribution suggests that the type of seller who is willing to wait longer has a higher expected asset quality on average, which I refer to as the "monotonicity condition". Such a condition holds automatically for the special case in which there is only private information on asset quality, a category into which existing adverse selection models with one-1 Speci…cally, the distress position of a seller is modeled as his holding cost. 2 Such a phenomenon has been referred to as a buyers'strike or market freeze. See, for example, Diamond and Rajan (2011) and Tirole (2010) . 3 This setup is known as competitive search. dimensional asymmetric information fall. 4 In that case, the theory predicts a separating equilibrium that exhibits downward-distorted trading rates in which sellers who are more willing to wait longer trade at a higher price but more slowly. In other words, this equilibrium predicts low trading volume, limited market participation, and trading delay for distressed sellers.
With two-dimensional asymmetric information, the monotonicity condition may be violated, resulting in di¤erent market phenomena. In particular, when the impact of a distress position dominates the e¤ect of asset quality, buyers know that the average asset bought from sellers who are more willing to wait can actually be of lower quality. As a result, buyers are no longer willing to pay a higher price for the asset, undermining the full separation mechanism.
In this case, I focus on one type of semi-pooling equilibrium that yields several novel predictions and rationalizes …re-sale phenomena. First, it involves upward-distorted trading rates and a discontinuity of price with respect to types, implying a high volume of trades at a common depressed price. A distressed seller with a high-quality asset …nds it optimal to enter a pooling market, in which he can unload his assets quickly but at a price discount. Second, in contrast to standard lemon models that impose a pooling equilibrium, this type of semi-pooling equilibrium predicts that the larger the market share of highly distressed sellers, the steeper the required discounts. 5
Note that, unlike most existing models of …re sales or buyers'strikes that exogenously assume buyers are constrained and sellers are forced to sell, all buyers in my framework are unconstrained but may choose not to participate; moreover, sellers always have the choice to retain their assets or to sell them quickly at lower prices. My model thus provides a micro-foundation for these phenomena.
Furthermore, the theory sheds lights on when and why …re sales actually arise. Indeed, as Shleifer and Vishny (2010) discussed, empirical works have documented di¤erent trading outcomes across markets, and no existing theory is able to reconcile these two patterns. My paper therefore contributes to the literature by establishing a …re-sale outcome is only possible when the monotonicity condition is violated. Speci…cally, this happens when there is twodimensional private information and when the market condition is such that sellers who value immediacy more tend to have higher-quality assets. The …re-sale outcome is thus more likely when there is a large fraction of distressed sellers in the market and these sellers have relatively 4 Models with one-dimensional private information that leads to trading delay for sellers with high-quality assets include Janssen and Roy (2002) , Inderst and Müller (2002) , and Camargo and Lester (2014) , etc. The same intuition also applies to models in which quantity is used as the instrument to separate types (for example, DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999) ). 5 In those frameworks (such as Akerlof (1970) and Eisfeldt (2004) ), an increase in the sellers' distress level should increase both volume and price because sellers with high-quality assets are more eager to trade as they become more distressed, which improves the average quality of the pool. As discussed in Uhlig (2010) , such a prediction is actually counterfactual.
higher-quality assets. In Section 4, I further show how these two equilibria lead to distinct empirical predictions, connecting them to di¤erent empirical evidence.
Relation to Literature My work is closest to that of Guerrieri et al. (2010) , who apply the notion of a competitive search equilibrium to a static environment with adverse selection and uninformed principals who are allowed to post contracts. 6 This paper contributes to the literature by considering asymmetric information on both private and common values. Furthermore, mine is the …rst paper to show that it is the e¤ect of multidimensional private information that leads to semi-pooling equilibria. These …ndings in regard to semi-pooling equilibria constitute a novel contribution to the literature on competitive search (e.g., Moen (1997) , Burdett et al. (2001) , Mortensen and Wright (2002) , and Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) ), where a fully separating equilibrium is always obtained.
The paper also makes a methodological contribution by developing a characterization method for continuous types with mechanism design approach. This approach not only simpli…es the equilibrium characterization to solving a di¤erential equation, but also facilitates extending the analysis to a more general environment. Speci…cally, the constructing algorithm in Guerrieri et al. (2010) is designed for the monotonicity case and thus for a fully separating equilibrium only. My approach can be applied to any underlying distribution (including the ones that leads to non-monotonicity) and for semi-pooling equilibria.
Building on Guerrieri et al. (2010) , the contemporaneous work of Guerrieri and Shimer (2014a) also emphasizes the idea that liquidity works as a screening mechanism; in that work, they consider private information on the common value only and therefore obtain a fully separating equilibrium. The notion of a …re sale in Guerrieri and Shimer (2014a) refers to the drop in the trading price when the equilibrium resale value decreases. In contrast, the term …re sale in my paper refers to the case in which a relatively distressed seller enters a pooling market, in which he can sell his asset more quickly (because of an upward-distorted buyer-seller ratio) but takes an undervalued price. These features are unique to the constructed semi-pooling equilibria and also imply distinct market activities. 7
The two-dimensional information problem has been studied in di¤erent settings with screening contracts, in which di¤erent instruments (such as quantity) are used to screen types. In a two-dimensional information setting with only one instrument, we should expect that prices can reveal at most the type that summarizes two-dimensional preference heterogeneity (see, for example, Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991) and Biais et al. (2000) ). My framework adds insights to this line of literature by showing that, in decentralized markets, a fully separating mecha-6 As discussed in Guerrieri et al. (2010) , this equilibrium concept is similar to the re…ned equilibrium concept developed in Gale (1992) , and Gale (1996) . 7 A follow-up paper by Guerrieri and Shimer (2014b) studies multidimensional private information in an environment where the monotonicity condition holds but with a weaker o¤-path restriction.
nism in respect to the e¤ective type cannot be sustained when the monotonicity condition fails.
In this case, a semi-pooling equilibrium with features of a …re sale exists. 8 It is worth noting that although there are well-known pooling results (such as ironing) in the optimal screening contract, the underlying economic force is very di¤erent from the competitive framework here.
The construction of the semi-pooling equilibrium in my model is driven by the buyer's free-entry condition instead of by the principal's pro…t maximization. Such a constraint is not present in the optimal screening problem.
This paper is also related to the literature based on the random-matching framework, in- and Wright (1993) , Trejos and Wright (1995) , and Shi (1995) ). 9 In particular, recent works by Chiu and Koeppl (2016) and Camargo and Lester (2014) consider one dimensional private information and use their frameworks to study government intervention. 10
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and de…nes the equilibrium concept. Section 3 establishes my approach to characterizing equilibria and the main results. Section 4 establishes the empirical implications for di¤erent informational structures.
Section 5 studies e¢ ciency and policy implications. All omitted proofs can be found in the appendix.
Model
Players. There is a continuum of sellers and buyers. Both sellers and buyers are risk-neutral and in…nitely lived, with a common discount rate r: Time is continuous, and the time horizon is in…nite. Each seller owns a single asset, which is nondivisible. The assets vary in their dividend ‡ows at each instant, indexed by s 2 S = [s L ; s H ] R + : Sellers' types are two-dimensional and unobservable: (1) the quality of asset they own s and (2) their distress positions, which are modeled as holding costs c > 0: 11 The support of c is some arbitrary set C which can assume 8 Such force is not present in Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991) (which studies one single informed trader in a Walrasian framework), nor in Biais et al. (2000) (as it analyzes only the case in which the monotonicity condition holds). 9 Williamson and Wright (2008) provides a detailed survey of this line of literature. 1 0 Camargo and Lester (2014) characterizes a set of equilibria in which sellers with high-quality assets exit the market at a lower rate since they are more likely to reject the o¤er in a random search framework. They show that the policy might slow down market recovery, depending on the fraction of lemons in the market. Chiu and Koeppl (2016) , on the other hand, assume a pooling equilibrium and focus on the timing of the intervention. The other side of the market consists of homogeneous buyers, who can only buy one unit of the asset and do not need to pay any holding costs but simply enjoy the dividend ‡ow of an asset. Thus, the gain from trade in this environment is the holding cost. A buyer can choose to enter the market by paying a ‡ow cost k > 0; which provides him an opportunity to meet a seller. I further assume that the measure of buyers is strictly larger than the measure of sellers.
Hence, the measure of buyers who decide to enter the market is determined by the free-entry condition. 12
To simplify the exposition, I assume that when an agent trades, he is removed from the market and replaced by a new agent of identical type. Nevertheless, as shown in Appendix A.1, main results in this stationary model hold in a dynamic environment with endogenous evolution of an aggregate distribution. 13
Bilateral Trades Buyers can enter the market by posting a trading price p and incurring a ‡ow cost k; or they can exit the market. There is a continuum of markets characterized by a price p 2 R + : Both buyers and sellers choose their preferred market, with rational expectations about the buyer-seller ratio associated with each market, denoted by (p): Within each market, traders form bilateral matches subject to a random matching function. A seller who enters the market (p; (p)) is matched with a buyer with the Poisson rate m( (p)): The matching function m( ) is assumed to be a strictly increasing function of ; which captures the idea that a higher buyer-seller ratio implies that a seller can …nd a buyer faster (and therefore implies a higher trading rate for sellers). Furthermore, as is standard, the matching function m( ) is assumed to be twice continuously di¤erentiable and strictly concave. On the other hand, a buyer in market (p; (p)) meets a seller at the rate n( (p)); where n( ) is assumed to be a strictly decreasing function of . That is, a higher buyer-seller ratio makes it harder for a buyer to meet a seller.
Trading in pairs requires that m( ) = n( ).
When entering the market (p; (p)); a seller (s; c) enjoys a ‡ow payo¤ s c until he meets a buyer, which happens at Poisson rate m( ). The expected utility of such a seller is given by:
where x is de…ned as x s c 2 X fxjx = s c; s 2 S and c 2 Cg:
1 2 This structure is designed to emphasize the idea that there is plenty of capital available in the market; therefore, any reduction in liquidity, if it arises, is endogenous and driven by informational frictions. 1 3 One convenient feature of this setup is that one can construct stationary equilibria while the aggregate distribution evolves over time. This property makes the fully dynamic environment tractable. It is also straightforward to allow for resale. More details are presented in the published working paper version.
The type x is then the su¢ cient statistic for sellers'motivation to trade, which is a combination of the asset quality and distress position. A seller enjoys a higher payo¤ when holding the asset if the asset quality is higher or if he is less distressed. This two-dimensional problem is made much simpler by the fact that one single variable x entirely captures sellers'incentives.
I therefore directly characterize the equilibrium with respect to the e¤ective type x: 14
Since buyers only care only about asset quality (i.e., the common value component of the seller's type), a buyer's expected value for buying the asset from type x is then given by
where h : X ! R + and the function h(x) depends on the underlying joint distribution of (s; c): As I will show later, the property of this function is crucial for the equilibrium outcome.
Given that sellers'types are unobservable, buyers form rational beliefs about the composition of sellers in each market. Let ( jp) denote the conditional cumulative distribution of sellers' types in each market p: Buyers'payo¤s, denoted by J(p; (p); ( jp)); in each market p can be expressed as:
d (e xjp) p J(p; ( jp); (p)) :
Equilibrium
Let P denote the set of feasible prices: P = [0; s H r ]: 15 If a seller chooses not to enter the market, he then receives his autarky value, x r : Such a choice is denoted by ?. 1 4 In other words, sellers with same incentives are treated as if they were the same for both on and o¤ equilibrium path. A weaker o¤-path restriction would further expand the equilibria set (see Guerrieri and Shimer (2014b) ).
1 5 This is because no trade takes place at prices either above the highest asset quality or below zero.
E2(b)
Optimal price-posting: There does not exist any p 0 = 2 P such that J(p 0 ; (p 0 ); ( jp 0 )) > 0;
and (p 0 ) and (xjp 0 ) satisfy the following condition:
To understand the equilibrium concept, …rst consider the price that is posted in equilibrium, p 2 P : The sellers'optimality condition requires that sellers choose optimally which submarket to enter, taking as given the price p and the trading rate-which is determined by the buyer-seller ratio (p)-in each submarket. The buyers'optimality condition, E2(a), states that a buyer must earn zero pro…t for any active market p 2 P , given the expected trading rate m( (p)) and the expected asset quality ( jp) in that market.
As standard in the competitive search literature, the equilibrium concept imposes restrictions on beliefs about the buyer-seller ratio for markets that are not open, which is speci…ed in Condition E2(b): 16 Speci…cally, when a buyer contemplates a deviation and o¤ers a new price p 0 = 2 P , he takes the sellers' equilibrium utilities V (x) as given and expects a buyer-ratio larger than zero only if there is a seller type who is willing to come to this market. Moreover, he expects the lowest buyer-ratio for which he can …nd such a seller type, which means that he expects sellers to queue up for this new price until it is no longer pro…table from them to do so. 17 One can understand Condition E2(b) by considering the following hypothetical adjustment process. If a buyer expects 0 > (p 0 ); this implies that some sellers obtain a higher value in this new market than their equilibrium utilities V (x). As a result, they would keep ‡owing into this market, pulling down the trading rate. Throughout this process, type-x sellers will stop entering this market until 0 < (p 0 ; x): This process stops at the value of (p 0 ) = inf x2X (p 0 ; x); at this value, the type of seller who is willing to come to this market at the lowest buyer-seller ratio is indi¤erent, while all other sellers strictly prefer to stay in their equilibrium market. Hence, the belief puts only positive weight on these sellers. In other words, the type of seller who is willing to accept the lowest buyer-ratio at this new price determines both the composition (xjp 0 ) and the buyer-seller ratio (p 0 ):
1 6 It also resembles the re…ned Walrasian general-equilibrium approach developed in Gale (1992) . See Guerrieri et al. (2010) for a detailed discussion regarding di¤erent re…nements developed in the literature. 1 7 Such a requirement is called the market utility property in the competitive search literature, which is in the spirit of subgame perfection. As discussed in Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) , the buyer-seller ratio function (p) acts similar to hedonic price schedule in Rosen (1974) .
Benchmark
Before characterizing the equilibrium, I …rst consider an environment where buyers can observe sellers' type x and where the value to buyers is given by h(x): 18 Such an environment is the canonical competitive search model put forth by Moen (1997) .
One can then solve the equilibrium independently for each type. The restriction on beliefs in this environment then suggests that, when opening a new market p 0 for type x; a buyer expects a buyer-seller ratio (p 0 ) that makes this seller indi¤erent. In other words, condition E2(b) is simply reduced to the statement that, there is no market (p 0 ; (p 0 )) such that sellers are indi¤erent while buyers are strictly better o¤. As a result, the combination of price and trading rate in equilibrium, denoted by (p F B (x); F B (x)); must be Pareto e¢ cient. Given that buyers must earn zero, the equilibrium solution must then maximize sellers'utilities subject to buyers' free-entry condition E2(a):
The …rst order condition for the equilibrium buyer-seller ratio yields:
In words, the equilibrium trading rate when x is observable depends on the ratio of the gain from trade over the buyers'searching cost, where h(x) x = E[cjx]: The higher the gain from trade, the higher the trading rate (i.e., a higher level of market participation). In the special case with constant holding cost c, sellers'type is the asset quality s and the …rst-best trading rate is independent of asset quality. This immediately suggests that …rst-best allocations cannot be implemented in an environment where asset quality is unobservable: facing the same trading rate, the low-type seller has incentives to pretend to be a higher type in order to obtain a higher price.
Characterization
In an equilibrium fP ; (p); ( jp)g; the outcome for a type-x seller can be described by the pair of functions fp (x); (p (x))g; where p (x) denotes the sellers' optimal market choice p (x)
arg max e p2P [? V (e p; (e p); x): To characterize the equilibrium, I prove that the equilibrium outcome must satisfy a number of properties by setting up a mechanism design problem. One can interpret this problem from the viewpoint of an imaginary market designer, who allocates buyers and sellers into di¤erent markets by designing the price and the buyer-seller ratio for each market so that both sellers'and buyers'optimality conditions are satis…ed.
Sellers' Optimality For the sellers' side, by the revelation principle, an outcome that satis…es the sellers'optimality condition E1 can be achieved if and only if it is optimal for the agent to report truthfully under the direct revelation mechanism fp (x); (x)g; where p : X ! R + and : X ! R + : That is, the mechanism, which is a pair of functions fp ( ); ( )g that assigns the type x seller into the market fp (x); (x)g; must satisfy the sellers' truth-telling condition:
With this interpretation, Lemma 1 establishes the conditions under which the sellers'optimality condition is satis…ed.
Lemma 1 The pair of functions fp ( ); ( )g satis…es the sellers' optimality condition if and only if the following three conditions are satis…ed:
where x L denotes the lower bound of X:
The proof follows from standard arguments in the mechanism design literature (e.g., Milgrom
and Segal (2002)), where 1 r+m( (x)) is the partial derivative of V (p; ; x) with respect to x and so the envelope condition yields condition (IC).
Condition (M ) formally establishes that the trading rate must be non-increasing with seller's type for any incentive-compatible mechanism. The reason is straighforward: the marginal rate of substitution between prices and trading rates of a seller is determined by his ‡ow value of holding an asset. Hence, a seller who enjoys a higher ‡ow value (a higher type x) is more willing to wait longer in exchange for a higher price. 19 Buyers' Optimality On the buyers' side, the mechanism must satisfy the buyers' freeentry condition E2(a) so that the buyers'allocation generates the correct buyer-seller ratio in each market. De…ne (p) (x) for any x : p (x) = p and P = fp (x) : x 2 Xg. The expected asset value to buyers in any market is determined by the conditional distribution of sellers who are assigned to market p: The free-entry condition then requires that the price in each market equals the expected asset quality minus the buyers'expected searching cost in that market, which gives:
; for 8p 2 P :
Lemma 1 and the buyers'free-entry condition (3) establish the properties of any mechanism that is feasible. Each mechanism maps to an equilibrium fP ; (p); ( jp)g that satis…es E1 and E2(a), but not the buyers'optimal price-posting, E2(b). I now use condition E2(b) to further identify a necessary condition for which a feasible mechanism can be implemented as an equilibrium outcome. That is, a buyer will not deviate by posting a price that is not recommended by the market designer. 20
In order to check whether a buyer has an incentive to post a new price p 0 , one …rst needs to know which type a buyer will attract, which is established by the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 Given a feasible mechanism fp ( ); ( )g and given that (x) > 0 8x; for any p 0 outside the range of p ( ); the unique seller who will come to market p 0 , denoted by T (p 0 ); is given by :
Note that since (x) is weakly decreasing, p (x) must be weakly increasing for any feasible mechanism. According to Lemma 2, if a new price p 0 is higher (lower) than any existing price, the unique seller who comes to this market is then the highest (lowest) type. Moreover, when the price schedule jumps upward from p 1 to p 2 at a pointx; for any price p 0 2 (p 1 ; p 2 ),x is the unique seller who comes to this new market since x = x + =x:
To understand this result, recall that, according to condition E2(b), a buyer expects the lowest buyer-seller ratio for which he can …nd a seller type; moreover, the buyer-seller ratio is such that this seller will be indi¤erent between this new market and his original market.
Consider a new price p 0 than is higher than any existing price. Since the highest types value immediacy least, if the combination of this new high price and low speed is such that the highest type is indi¤erent, all other types must …nd this new combination strictly worse and thus would rather stay in their original markets. This thus explains why the highest type is the unique seller who comes to this market in this case.
There is a similar result when a new price is lower that all existing prices. When the combination of this lowest price and higher speed makes the lowest type indi¤erent, all other sellers, who value immediacy less, will not …nd this new market attractive. This explains why the lowest type is the only type that will come to this new market. The same logic can be applied to the case when the price schedule jumps.
Since Lemma 2 has identi…ed the seller type that a buyer would attract by opening a new market, one then needs to know only the expected payo¤ of a buyer who purchases an asset from such a seller. Hence, buyers'payo¤ function h(x); which depends on the joint distribution of asset quality and distress positions, plays an important role.
So far, I have not imposed restrictions on buyers' payo¤ functions h(x). Below, I show that the presence of two-dimensional private information implies that markets have di¤erent perceived motives for selling and thus have di¤erent equilibrium outcomes.
Monotonicity: A Fully Separating Equilibrium
I …rst start with the environment where the monotonicity condition is satis…ed.
Assumption A1 (Monotonicity) The function h(x) is (1a) a continuously di¤erentiable function and (1b) strictly increasing in x (h 0 ( ) > 0):
Such an assumption can be understood as an environment in which the informational motive (on the common value component) dominates. Speci…cally, the underlying joint distribution of (s; c) is such that sellers with the larger ‡ow value x (i.e., those who are more willing to wait) have a better asset quality s on average. The exact condition on the joint distribution is provided
Consider a simple case where s and c are independent and s follows an uniform distribution.
In this case, E[cjx] is then weakly decreasing in x; since a very high (low) willingness to wait implies that the holding cost is coming for the lower (higher) part of the support of C. Given
; the monotonicity condition thus holds when E[cjx] does not decrease too much relative to the increase in x.
It is worth noting that this assumption holds automatically when there is only one dimensional private information regarding asset quality. That is, conditional on c; asset quality determines the sellers'type. As a result, those with a higher payo¤ of holding the asset (higher x) must have a higher-quality asset (higher s).
Lemma 3 shows that, whenever this condition holds, the unique equilibrium would be fully separating with respect to x:
Lemma 3 (Full Separation) Under A1, there exists no submarket where seller types are pooled.
To see this, consider a pooling market for sellers x 2 [x 1 ; x 2 ] X: If a buyer deviates by posting a new price p 0 that is only slightly higher than the original pooling price, he expects to attract the highest type-x in the original pooling market. That is, according to Lemma 2, T (p 0 ) = x 2 : Moreover, since A1 suggests that h(x) is strictly increasing, a buyer can obtain the most valuable asset from the original pool market by simply paying " more:
As a result, this deviation is pro…table for buyers.
The argument here also highlights why assumption A1 is crucial. Without it, the type of seller that is most willing to wait may not have the most valuable assets. Furthermore, under A1, this pooling necessarily implies that the asset quality in the market right above x 2 must jump upward. Hence, in order to prevent seller-x 2 from entering the market above him and to satisfy buyers'free-entry condition, the price p (x) must jump upward and the buyer-seller ratio (x) must jump downward at x 2 . This thus explains why the above deviation is always possible.
Lemma 3 thus allows us to focus on fully separating equilibria. The free-entry condition (3) can then be rewritten as:
Substituting this payment schedule into (IC) ; we get:
Taking the derivative with respect to x on both sides, one then obtains the following di¤erential equation for (x) :
In summary, in order to satisfy the incentive-compatibility constraints and the free-entry condition, the buyer-seller ratio function ( ) in any separating equilibrium must satisfy the above di¤erential equation (5) ; subject to the condition (M ). Lastly, the initial condition is pinned down by Lemma 4:
Lemma 4 (No distortion for the lowest type) Under A1, the lowest type achieves his …rst-best utilities in any fully separating equilibrium.
Under Assumption A1, buyer's valuation is higher for a higher-type seller. Hence, a lowertype seller has incentive to pretend to be a higher-type. In other word, the incentive constraint binds downward. The trading rate is thus distorted downward in order to prevent a lower type seller from mimicking. Intuitively, since none has incentives to mimic the lowest type, there is no need to distort the trading rate for the lowest type, which gives the initial condition for
Equation (5).
Speci…cally, suppose that the equilibrium trading rate is also distorted downward for the lowest type (i.e., (
The lowest type seller's utility in
for the lowest type is distorted downward, the new market (p 0 ; (p 0 )) that makes the lowest type to be indi¤erent is then below buyers'free-entry condition (represented by the dash brown line). Hence, buyers are strictly better o¤ by o¤ering
this case must be lower than his …rst-best utility. By o¤ering a new price p 0 = p F B (x L ) which is lower than all existing prices, buyers expect to attract the lowest type according to Lemma 2.
As shown in Figure 1 , the buyer-seller ratio (p 0 ) at this new market that makes the lowest seller indi¤erent must then be strictly smaller than F B (x L ): As a result, this new market (p 0 ; (p 0 )) constitutes a pro…table deviation for buyers.
Lemma 4 thus gives the initial condition (x L ) = F B (x L ); which then uniquely pinned down the equilibrium buyer-seller ratio function (x): 21 Figure 2 illustrates the solution of the buyer-seller ratio function for the special case with homogenous holding cost c; in which sellers' types directly map to asset quality and the …rst best solution is independent of asset quality.
Given (x); the corresponding price function p (x) is given by the free entry condition (4) : We can therefore conclude that the schedule fp (x); (x)g is the unique mechanism that satis…es both (E1) and (E2), mapping to the least-cost separating equilibrium. Speci…cally, a downward-distorted buyer-seller ratio implies that fewer buyers enter the market, and high-type sellers trade at a lower speed but at a higher price than do low-type sellers. Due to the distortion, all sellers (expect the lowest type) obtain lower equilibrium utilities than those in the …rst-best benchmark.
Proposition 1 Under A1, the unique solution to the mechanism design problem that implements the equilibrium outcome is given by the buyer-seller ratio function : x ! R + ; and the price function p : x ! R + , where (x) is the unique solution to (5) with the initial condition (x L ) = F B (x L ); and where p (x) is given by (4).
2 1 One can see that the standard condition of uniqueness does not hold at (xL) = F B (xL). In fact, there will be two solutions; however, the other solution increases with s and therefore violates Condition (M :). Corollary 1 Under A1, (1) the …rst-best solution f F B (x); p F B (x)g is not implementable; and
(2) the equilibrium buyer-seller ratio (x) is downward-distorted compared to the …rst-best. That
3. 
On the other hand, outside of this region, a very high (low) willingness to wait implies that the holding cost must be low (high). 22 I now show that a fully separating equilibrium (with respect to the e¤ective type x) cannot exist whenever h( ) has an interior strict local maximum. 23 The intuition is as follows. A fully screening mechanism is a combination of a downward-distorted trading probability and an upward-sloping price scheme. To generate such a price schedule, the market designer must make sure that buyers are willing to pay the price in each market, given the expected asset value in that market. 24 However, if the types who are willing to wait longer have assets that are worth less, buyers'are no longer willing to pay a higher price for those assets, which undermines the full screening mechanism and leads to semi-pooling equilibria.
To facilitate the construction of semi-pooling equilibria, given fp (x); (x)g; de…ne the func- Proposition 2 For any equilibrium outcome fp (x); (x)g, the corresponding buyers'function H(x) cannot have an interior strict local maximum.
Proposition 2 thus suggests that if the underlying function h( ) has an interior strict local maximum, a fully separating equilibrium cannot be sustained.
In general, for any given arbitrary distribution of (s; c); which determines the shape of function h(x) and the distribution of x; there may exist multiple ways to construct semi-pooling equilibria, and in contrast to the monotonic case, the equilibrium is usually not unique. Nevertheless, one can still apply the developed methods to construct equilibria.
To proceed, I provide detailed construction for two particular types of semi-pooling equilibria and establish the required condition on the underlying distribution for each construction. Then, I conclude with a general discussion on how to apply the developed methods for any arbitrary distribution. intervals. Nevertheless, to apply this method, the necessary condition is that the underlying distribution admits a continuous functionĤ( ) that is weakly increasing.
By construction,Ĥ(x) is strictly increasing when types are fully separated. Hence, similar as before, the buyer-seller ratio must be downward distorted. The construction involves pooling all sellers below a marginal type x ; as illustrated in the right panel of Figure 4 . Moreover, the marginal type x must satisfy the following conditions:
(1) the monotonicity condition holds above this marginal type; and (2) the average quality below this cuto¤ type is strictly higher than the quality of his own asset. That is, the following condition holds:
Whether such a cuto¤ type exists depends on the underlying distribution. First of all, in order to satisfy the …rst condition, function h( ) must increase after a certain point. Let x denote the greatest local minimum point of function h( ). Moreover, for any x >x; the ability of condition (H1) to hold then depends on both the shape of h(x) as well as the measure of x.
Intuitively, condition (H1) holds when underlying distribution suggests that sellers with lower
x have relatively high asset quality. 25
Observe that, by construction, the marginal type x is now the minimum ofĤ(x): Speci…cally,
That is, from the viewpoint of buyers, the marginal type has the lowest expected asset quality.
In particular, condition (H1) suggests that the average asset quality in the pooling market is higher than h(x ):
The marginal seller thus has incentives to mimic a lower seller type (x < x ) and/or a higher seller type (x > x ): In other words, the incentive constraints bind both directions for the marginal type. As a result, one should expect distortion for both the market above and below this marginal seller. This is in sharp contrast to the case of monotonically increasingĤ(x) and thus only downward incentive constraints bind. Moreover, because the marginal seller is the one with the lowest quality, none has incentives to mimic him; hence, for the same intuition as in Lemma 4, this seller must receive the …rst-best utility.
The distortion can be implemented as follows: First of all, sinceĤ(x) is strictly increasing after x and the marginal seller x is less willing to wait compared with sellers with a higher x, all these markets must involve a higher price and lower trading speed. That is, the buyer-seller ratio is again downward distorted for x > x : On the other hand, since x is more willing to wait compared with sellers with a lower-x, the distortion in the pooling market must involve a higher trading rate and a lower selling price, as established by Condition (M ) in Lemma 1.
The exact combination of price and buyer-seller ratio in the pooling market is thus pinned down so that (1) the marginal type is indi¤erent between going to the pooling market and his own market where he receives the …rst-best utility, and (2) the free-entry condition holds, where 2 5 Speci…cially, if the underlying distribution admits a seller type, denoted by x, whose asset quality is the same as the average quality of all sellers below him. That is, x is the seller x that satisifes E[h(e x)je x x] = h(x) and
x > x: Then, condition (H1) holds for any seller type that is between the local minimum point x and the type x:
That is, any x 2 (x ; x) can be used to construct such semi-pooling equilibria. the average quality is given by q(x ): Formally, for any x >x that satis…es condition (H1) ; de…ne a pair of functions (p q (x); q (x)) that solves the following equations:
Speci…cally, the solution for the pooling market, denoted by (p q (x ); q (x )); is illustrated in Figure 5 . It is the intersection point between V F B (x ) and the buyers'free-entry condition,
giving an upward-distorted trading rate q (x ) > F B (x): Note that since the average quality in the pooling market is strictly higher than the marginal type, the free-entry condition for buyers in the pooling market (valued at q(x )), represented by the dashed line, is thus above the free-entry condition in the market for the marginal type x ; represented by the black line.
This explains why condition (H1) is necessary for the presence of an upward-distorted trading rate.
Moreover, the upward-distorted buyer-seller ratio means that buyers must wait for a long time to meet a seller in the pooling market, and hence they must be compensated with a low price given their high search cost, which is represented by
Indeed, this is the force that drives down the price in the pooling market, despite the fact that the average asset quality q(x ) is higher than h(x ): The combination of high trading rate and low price thus guarantees that only relatively distressed sellers are willing to enter. Proposition 3 summarizes the existence condition and characterization for a …re-sale equilibrium x :
Proposition 3 There exists a semi-pooling equilibrium x > x with an upward-distorted trading rate, if the following inequalities are satis…ed:
Such an equilibrium is characterized by the following equilibrium buyer-seller ratio and equilibrium price function, respectively:
where (x; F B (x )) denotes the solution of (5) with the initial condition F B (x ):
It is straightforward to show that this construction satis…es Lemma 1 and the free-entry condition. What is left is to show that condition E2(b) is also satis…ed. In particular, for any q(x ) > h(x ); the price schedule jumps at the marginal type x from the pooling price p q (x )
to the …rst-best price for the marginal type p F B (x ): According to Lemma 2 2, any deviation p 0 between these two prices will attract only the marginal type T (p 0 ) = x with quality h(x ): Given that the marginal type achieves his …rst-best utility, any deviation p 0 and the corresponding buyer-seller ratio (p 0 ) necessarily imply a distortion, which therefore decreases buyers'utility. 26
Existence of Fire-Sale equilibria
To further highlight the underlying economic force that leads to …re-sales, I now consider the simple example presented in Figure 3 , where (s; c) are independently distributed and c 2 fc L ; c H g.
Let G s (s) denote the marginal distribution of s and denote the measure of sellers with high holding costs.
In this example, the buyers' value function h( ) strictly increases in x after x = s H c H ; since all sellers above x must have a low holding cost c L : h(x) = x + c L : In order to construct a …re-sale equilibrium, one must …rst …nd the cuto¤ type x >x so that condition (H1) holds.
Pick the type right above x to be the cuto¤ type, x =x +". By construction, all sellers that are highly distressed (i.e., with holding cost c H ) enter the pooling market, and thus the average asset quality owned by distressed sellers is the expected mean of the underlying asset quality. On the other hand, sellers with low holding cost enter the pooling market if and only if their asset quality is low enough (i.e., below x + c L ); and thus the expected asset quality among these sellers yields E[sjs x + c L ]. The expected asset quality in the pooling market is then the weighted average of asset quality bought from these two groups of sellers. Condition (H1)
can thus be rewritten as:
where = +(1 )Gs(x +c L ) denotes the share of sellers with high holding costs in the pooling market.
Clearly, a higher measure of distressed sellers (i.e., a higher ) thus improves the average asset quality in the pooling market. That is, it is easier for condition (H1) to be satis…ed. By the same logic, when the underlying distribution of assets improves (that is, consider …rst-order stochastic dominance given a …xed interval) the average asset quality in the pooling market increases, and thus the …re-sale equilibrium is more likely to arise. 27
This simple example illustrates that the …re-sale equilibrium exists only when the e¤ect on the distress level (the private value component) is strong enough so that the asset quality of those who want to sell faster is actually higher than the quality of assets held by some nondistressed sellers. Figure 6 below illustrates the equilibrium price function and buyer-seller ratio in a …re-sale equilibrium. The ‡at schedule represents the pooling submarket.
General Discussion on Equilibrium Construction
Given any arbitrary distribution, there may exist multiple ways to construct semi-pooling equilibria. Nevertheless, Lemma 1 and the free-entry condition characterize the whole set of feasible mechanisms (i.e., conditions E1 and E2(a) are satis…ed). Hence, one would just need to use Lemma 2 to check the possible deviation (i.e., condition E2(b)):
While the exact construction and the shape ofĤ(x) may di¤er, the logic behind the direction of distortion remains the same. Speci…cally, for any constructedĤ(x); under the region wherê Furthermore, as shown in the construction for …re-sale equilibria, it is possible to combine these two types of distortion. However, according to the monotonicity condition in Lemma 1, upward distortion must come before downward distortion. This also explains whyĤ(x) can have an interior local minimum (as in …re-sale equilibria), but not an interior strict local maximum, as established in Proposition 2. The logic thus also suggests that one can also combine both …re-sale and ironing techniques for non-monotonic functions with multiple peaks. However, the …re-sale pooling market must start from the bottom and the ironing interval must come after.
Empirical Implications
The developed theory provides a link between the market environment (i.e., information structures and distribution of sellers' distress positions) and market liquidity (i.e., asset prices and trading volume). Depending on whether the monotonicity condition holds, di¤erent types of equilibria arise, thus generating two distinct empirical illiquidity patterns: (1) a dry-up in trading volume and (2) a high trading volume at a steep price discount.
The second illiquid pattern is a unique feature of the semi-pooling equilibria constructed in Section 3.2.2, which I label as a …re sale. Moreover, I now show formally that only this equilibrium can generate the following features often associated with a "…re-sale" in the literature:
(1) An increase in the distress of an individual seller lead to a disproportional price discount.
Distressed sellers quickly unwind their positions at a price below the fundamental value.
(2) An increase in market-wide distress leads individual to face a higher distress discount. 29 To formalize these results, I analyze the e¤ect of market-wide distress in a …re sale equilibrium. Speci…cally, for the sake of illustration, throughout this section I consider the simple example in Section 3.2.3, where the distress level of sellers is binary. A larger measure of highly distressed sellers (denoted by parameter = Pr(c = c H )) thus represents an increase in market-wide distress. Nevertheless, as discussed in detail below, the result holds more generally whenever the concerns of sellers'distress position become more severe.
Moreover, to highlight the importance of the observability of sellers' distress positions, I compare the result to the model with only 1-D asymmetric information (so that monotonicity condition always holds). I show that model the with 1-D asymmetric information cannot produce the above "…re-sale" features and it has distinct empirical predictions.
In both environments, the cash ‡ow of assets is given by y + s, where (y; ) are the common observable components of the asset's value and s is the sellers'private information for this asset, which follows a symmetric distribution with mean zero and with support on [ 1; 1]. The level of adverse selection is then parameterized by .
Formally, let (s; c) and p(s; c) denote the trading rate and price of a seller (s; c) in equilibrium. When sellers'distress levels are observable, which I refer it as 1-D asymmetric information case, one can apply the characterization in Section 3.1 for each distress position separately. 30 With 2-D asymmetric information considered throughout this section, I focus on the …re sale equilibrium; hence, the solution is derived in Section 3.2.3.
Aggregate Prices and Volumes
The total volume and the average trading price are then given, respectively, by: where g(s; c) = @ 2 G(s;c) @s@c denotes the joint density. To see clearly the role of asymmetric information compared to other existing channels, it is useful to look at cross-market comparisons.
Speci…cally, I use the trading volume and the price of a safe asset with no payo¤ uncertainty (i.e., = 0) as a benchmark, denoted by # 0 and } 0 , respectively. To …x the idea, one can interpret agency MBS are a safe asset and private-label MBS are the assets that su¤er adverse selection, 2 9 For example, as discussed in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) , tightened lending standards in the market (which makes more banks become distressed) may lead to further downward asset prices. 3 0 That is, conditional on c, asset quality determines the sellers'type, thus (s; c) = (s c):
since the originators are likely to have private information. 31 For the sake of comparison, I assume that everything else is the same for these two assets and buyers have access to both markets.
The predictions across markets distinguish this information based theory from other channels that rely on constrained investors or buyers with downward-sloping demand. One can easily show that without private information, # = # 0 and } = } 0 for any dispersion and for any distribution of distress costs, respectively. In other words, this channel will a¤ect both markets in the same way, and thus cannot explain why illiquidity arises in one market but not the other. By contrast, the theory predicts that more information-sensitive assets would have distinct prices and volumes compared to safe assets, which is formalized in the Proposition below.
Proposition 4 In a …re-sale equilibrium, with the level of adverse selection …xed, an increase in the market-wide distress level ( ) leads to a higher trading volume # and a lower price }.
Further, there exists such that for any > ; # > # 0 : In contrast, for any > 0; # < # 0 in the model with 1-D asymmetric info.
Note that there are two con ‡icting e¤ects on the price in the pooling market. Fixing a marginal type x , an increase in the measure of distressed sellers ( ) means that more distressed sellers with higher quality assets enter the pooling market, which improves asset quality in the pool. On the other hand, when buyers'willingness to pay increases, the marginal seller now has a higher incentive to mimic. Hence, intuitively, the upward distortion that is needed to prevent
x from entering the pooling market must increase as well, which then further increases buyers' expected searching cost, driving down the price.
We can use Figure 5 to see that the buyer-seller ratio e¤ect must dominate in equilibrium.
Speci…cally, a higher quality in the pooling market shifts up the buyers' free-entry condition (which is represented by the green line). Hence, the corresponding solution (p q (x); q (x)) must move downward along the marginal type's indi¤erence curve. Therefore, the price in the pooling market goes down despite average seller quality improves. In other word, the buyer-seller ratio e¤ect must dominate.
As a result, the model predicts that the greater the market share of highly distressed sellers ( ), the steeper are the required discounts. One can easily see that, as a result, the aggregate volume rises and the weighted aggregate price declines, because more sellers now sell at a lower distressed price. In general, this result holds for any distribution that leads to an increase in
It is worth noting that the prediction on price is distinct from a standard adverse selection model that imposes a pooling equilibrium directly. In those models, there is only quality e¤ect.
Thus, a larger share of distressed sellers necessarily leads to a higher price instead of a lower one. Such a prediction is often deemed to be counterfactual. 32
Proposition 4 also highlights that both the underlying information structure and market conditions are important for the market outcomes. Indeed, when sellers' distress levels are observable, the volume is always lower for the more information-sensitive assets. 33 This is because that the model predicts a downward distorted buyer-seller ratio, even though the market becomes more distress. In other words, most trading takes place only in the market for relatively transparent (and hence liquid) assets, which therefore looks like a ‡ight to quality.
Distress Discount
Another aspect to examine regarding whether or not there is a …re sale comprises the price discounts faced by a distressed seller. Hence, I now turn to study the e¤ect of distress on selling prices faced by an individual seller. The distress discounts are de…ned as a decrease in transaction price due to an increase in distressed level, …xing the asset fundamental: 34 p(s) p(s; c L ) p(s; c H ):
Proposition 5 In a …re-sale equilibrium, distressed sellers with high-quality assets face a larger price discount than in an environment without asymmetric information. Furthermore, such a discount increases with market-wide distress ( ). In contrast, the distress discount is independent of market-wide distress ( ) under a 1-D asymmetric information model.
Recall that, in a …re-sale equilibrium, sellers with relatively high quality assets s > x + c L go to the pooling market only if he becomes distressed and enters a separating market otherwise.
Given that the price for the separating market is independent of and the price in the pooling market decreases with , the price discount thus increases with : On the other hand, since all sellers always enter a separating market in the 1-D asymmetric information model, the di¤erence in the price is only a function of holding costs and it is thus independent of :
Note that in a standard channel with downward demand, a more distressed seller would then face a lower price. Hence, it is useful to compare the prediction with the benchmark. The result highlights that the price discount is ampli…ed by sellers' distress position in a …re sale 3 2 See, for example, Uhlig (2010) . 3 3 Under 1-D asymmetric information case, there are two e¤ects on the average price: (1) Assets with lower quality are traded at higher rates. This composition e¤ect pushes down the average price;
(2) A downward distorted buyer-seller ratio leads to a higher individual price for sellers s > sL than the one under complete information.The composition e¤ect dominates when there are more mass on lower-quality assets. 3 4 When c is continuous, price discount for any asset quality is then given by @ p(s;c) @c : equilibrium. To understand the price discount, one can decompose the distress discount into the following terms for sellers with relatively high asset quality: 35
The …rst term represents the di¤erence between the average asset quality in the pooling market and the asset quality of a seller. Clearly, this term is zero for any separating equilibrium.
As in the standard adverse selection model with one pooling market, sellers with better assets su¤er a higher pooling discount. The second term represents the di¤erence in buyers'expected searching costs. A higher buyer-seller ratio in the pooling market implies that it is easier for a seller to …nd a buyer, and harder for a buyer to …nd a seller. As a result, the price drops further to compensate buyers.
Given any marginal type x , a higher leads to a larger buyer-seller ratio, which thus increases the price discount. Note that for the marginal type s = x + c L , the …rst term, is negative by construction. Hence, for such a marginal type, what drives the price down in this pooling market is indeed the upward-distorted trading rate, not the standard pooling discount.
This feature further highlights the additional force in this semi-pooling equilibrium. On the other hand, both forces -namely, the pooling discount and the high transaction cost -exist for sellers with higher asset quality, implying an even sharper discount for those sellers.
Discussion of Predictions and Evidence
Propositions 4 and 5 have established that only the semi-pooling equilibria with upward distorted buyer-seller ratio can generate the features often associated with "…re-sales" in the literature.
Hence, the theory provides an answer to why and when sellers actually engage in …re sales, or try to avoid them instead. Indeed, as Shleifer and Vishny (2010) discussed, empirical works have documented di¤erent trading outcomes across markets, and no existing theory is able to reconcile these two patterns. 36 Speci…cally, the model predicts that …re sales can exist only in an environment in which
(1) investors observe neither asset quality (the common value) nor sellers'trading motives (the private value), and, more importantly, (2) when distress costs dominate the motives for selling (as discussed in Section A.4.9). Only in this case does the equilibrium suggest a high trading volume at a distressed price. That is, …re sales with large distress discounts actually occur as 3 5 To be precise, the expression holds for sellers with relatively high asset quality (s > x + cL): Sellers with relatively low asset quality (any type s < x + cL) always go to the pooling market, regardless of their distress position, and therefore always trade at the pooling price. 3 6 The conventional explaination for …re sales assumes that high-valuation buyers are sidelined and distressed sellers are forced to sell below fundamental value. It is therefore silent about when …re sales actually exist.
documented in Pulvino (1998) , Coval and Sta¤ord (2007) , and Ellul et al. (2011). 37 One concrete example for this outcome is the housing markets, in which some sell fast at a highly depressed prices, while, at the same time, other sellers trade slower at relatively high prices. 38 In particular, one may interpret the pooling submarket to be the market for foreclosed houses. That is, the group of sellers who choose to default on their mortgages include some who cannot pay (highly distressed) and some who have lower-quality houses (strategic default). Our model thus predicts that, only when the above conditions hold, forced sales would account for a large fraction of total sales, leading to higher price discount. 39 If the conditions above are not satis…ed, the equilibrium always involves downward-distorted trading rates. Sellers choose to hold onto their illiquid assets, so most trading take place only in the market for relatively transparent (and hence liquid) assets. It therefore appears that sellers will tend to avoid selling a¤ected assets at …re-sale prices by mainly selling assets in liquid markets instead, consistent with Schlingemann et al. (2002) , Chernenko et al. (2014) , and Boyson et al. (2011). 40 This is true especially in the market for the AAA-rated private MBS. Pulvino (1998) shows that used planes sold by distressed airlines bring 10 to 20 percent lower prices than planes sold by undistressed airlines. Coval and Sta¤ord (2007) show that widespread selling by …nancially distressed mutual funds leads to transaction prices below fundamental value. Ellul et al. (2011) found that insurance companies that are relatively more constrained by regulation are more likely to sell downgraded bonds, which are subject to price discount. 3 8 Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) documents the existence of asymmetric information in real estate markets. 3 9 See Campbell et al. (2011) , who examined forced sale discounts by using information on individual bankruptcies, controlling observable characteristic of a house. 4 0 Schlingemann et al. (2002) …nd that …rms are more likely to divest segments from industries with a more liquid market for corporate assets, even when this means keeping some of their worst performing units. Similarly, in the MBS market, Chernenko et al. (2014) show that distressed mutual funds actively sell agency MBS instead of nontraditional securitization. Boyson et al. (2011) shows that most banks circumvent …re sales by shifting to deposits, issuing equity, and cherry picking. 4 1 This idea derives from the fact the drop in housing prices in 2007 resulted in some AAA-MBS, which were previously treated as safe assets, failing to deliver the high cash ‡ow that was promised. The fact that originators have more information about the credit quality and underlying composition of the securities therefore leads to an increase in adverse selection. See Gorton (2009) for a detailed description about how the chain of interlinked securities was sensitive to house prices and how asymmetric information was created via complexity. His view is also empirically supported by Agarwal et al. (2012) .
case, as shown in Propositions 4 and 5, …re sales will not occur even if banks become highly distressed.
In general, our theory provides a new testable prediction regarding the observability of sellers'distress positions and the existence of …re sales: …re sales are more likely to occur in lesstransparent and less-regulated markets in which sellers'distress levels are not publicly disclosed.
Examples include the housing markets, the market for used durable goods (where sellers'private motives are often unobservable), or when the distress of banks is driven by their counterparty risk exposures to complex …nancial networks that are di¢ cult for investor to assess. 42
Remarks on Empirical Measurement
In general, to test the empirical implications, one would need to carefully condition the exact information that is available to market participants.
With MBS markets, for example, one should consider all privately MBSs that provide identical information to buyers as one type of assets. To test the predictions established in Proposition 4, the markets under which issuers have more soft information should then be the ones subject to higher levels of adverse selection level (i.e., higher ). Moreover, everything else being equal, the model predicts that assets traded with higher price dispersion (conditional on observable characteristics) are more likely to have lower trading volumes. 43
Regarding predictions at the micro level (as in Proposition 5), empirical tests are more challenging given the nature of private information. Nevertheless, although the true quality of an asset is not observable to buyers when it is traded, some existing works use ex-post performance (such as the default rate for MBS) as a proxy of the asset quality. Similarly, when a seller chooses to default on his mortgage, buyers may not be able to di¤erentiate distressed from strategic defaulters. Existing work has made progress in this direction by combining detailed information about employment status, equity, and other assets-see, for example, Gerardi et al. (2015) .
Discussion on E¢ ciency
The method developed here (i.e., Lemma 1, E1; and the buyers' free entry condition, E2(a))
characterizes the set of feasible mechanisms. Within this set, the decentralized outcome is the one satisfying the additional condition E2(b) on buyers'optimal price-posting. Hence, it follows immediately that a social planner who is not subject to condition E2(b) can always do weakly better than the decentralized equilibrium.
As long as the monotonicity condition is satis…ed (Assumption 1), the decentralized outcome 4 2 Caballero and Simsek (2013) , for example, considers the environment when banks are uncertain about the …nancial network of cross exposures between …nancial institutions. 4 3 Along this line, Jankowitsch et al. (2011) shows that there is indeed a correlation between price dispersion in over-the-counter market and trading volume (as well as common liquidity measures).
has to be the least-cost fully separating equilibrium. However, a fully separating equilibrium, which implies distortions on trading rates, depends only on the support of the distribution and is clearly not necessarily e¢ cient (both in terms of total welfare or Pareto e¢ ciency). To see this, consider an asset distribution that has a very thin left tail but a high expected mean. In this case, a high-type seller can be better o¤ in a pooling market, where the price is valued at the average asset quality, than in a separating equilibrium, in which he su¤ers a high delay cost due to the thin left tail. Clearly, whenever a high-type seller is better o¤ in a pooling equilibrium, so is a low-type seller, since the latter simply receives a subsidy from a high-type seller. Hence, a fully separating equilibrium can be Pareto-dominated by a partial pooling equilibrium under certain distributions. 44
Do disclosure of Sellers' Distress Position improve e¢ ciency? Recall that the monotonicity condition is automatically holds when sellers'trading motives are observed. Hence, in an environment in which pooling is more desirable, traders can be better o¤ when the private value of holding an asset is unobservable. This can be seen from the …re-sale example. All sellers with a low holding cost are better o¤ when the holding cost is unobserved, regardless of their asset quality. This is because a seller with relatively low-quality assets e¤ectively receives a subsidy from sellers with better assets in the pooling market. On the other hand, a seller with relatively high-quality assets (s c L > x ) is better o¤ since the underlying range e¤ectively decreases and therefore implies a smaller distortion. For a similar reason, a seller with a relatively low-quality asset but a high holding cost (c H ) is also better o¤. Hence, the only type that might su¤er when the holding cost is unobserved is the type with a good asset but a high holding cost.
By the same logic discussed earlier, whether this high-type seller is better o¤ or not depends on which distortion is more costly: a price discount or a distortion in the trading rate. If the distribution is such that pooling is more desirable, the high-type seller is then better o¤ in the pooling equilibrium. If that is the case, then, counterintuitively, all types of sellers achieve higher equilibrium utilities when the holding cost is unobserved
Conclusion
This paper develops an information-based theory of illiquidity. It analyzes how two-dimensional asymmetric information of sellers leads endogenously to two di¤erent illiquidity patterns: (i) limited market participation and a dry-up in trading volumes, and (ii) a high trading volume at a depressed price (i.e., …re-sales). It establishes that …re sales can occur only when sellers' distress positions (private value of the asset) are unobserved by the market and such motives dominates the common value component.
A Appendix

A.1 Model with Dynamic Evolution of Distribution
This section considers an environment where both sellers and buyers leave the market once the trade takes place, instead of being replaced by an identical agent. At time 0, there is a unit measure one of sellers. Let G 0 (s; c) : S C ! [0; 1] denote the initial joint cumulative distribution of asset quality and holding cost. There is a large measure of buyers, who can choose to enter the market by paying a ‡ow cost k > 0: Hence, at each point of time, the measure of buyers entering the market is determined by the free-entry condition.
One convenient feature of this setup is that one can construct stationary equilibria, in which the set of o¤ered prices (denoted by P ), the trading rate in each market (p); and the composition of sellers in each market are time-invariant. The existence of stationary equilibria fP ; (p); ( jp)g can be seen directly from the payo¤ function. Heuristically, stationary sellers' trading strategies and the random matching in each market (i.e., all sellers in the same market trade with the same rate) imply that the composition of sellers within each market is stationary.
As a result, the buyers'expected matching value in each market is also time-invariant. Given that buyers can enter and exit instantaneously to generate the correct ratio (p) in each market at each point in time (the free-entry condition), a stationary equilibrium can therefore be sustained.
As a result, the solution fP ; (p); ( jp)g derived in the main model can be directly applied here. The only di¤erence is that the aggregate distribution does evolve over time and leads to non-stationary dynamics of aggregate prices and volumes. Speci…cally, given any initial distribution of asset qualities and distress positions, the trading volume # t and the weighted trading price } t at each point in time t are then given, respectively, by:
Given that g 0 (s; c) = @ 2 G 0 (s;c) @s@c and the law of motion dg t (s; c) = m( (s; c))g t (s; c), we thus have g t (s; c) = g 0 (s; c)e m( (s;c))t .
The time series movement of the price and volume is straightforward in this environment:
the volume decreases over time and converges to zero asymptotically, while the weighted price increases over time, given that most assets being sold earlier have a lower price.
A.2 Condition for Monotonicity
To guarantee that the function h( Lemma 5 If the joint distribution g satis…es the following condition:
where g v denotes the partial derivative with respect to the variable v, then h(x) is increasing in
x: If s and c are independent and the marginal distribution for c is log-concave, then h(x) is increasing in x:
Proof. Set z = s and x = s c: By the Jacobian of the transformation, the joint density of
It is well known that E[sjx] is increasing in x if @ @z@x ln b g(z; x) 0, that is, if the variables s and x are a¢ liated (see Milgrom and Weber (1982) ). When (s; c) are independent, @ @z@x ln b g(z; x) / [g 0 (c)] 2 g 00 (c)g(c) 0 () ln g(c) is concave.
The condition on the distribution borrows from the standard a¢ liation condition discussed in Milgrom and Weber (1982) . 45 
A.3 Equilibria with Ironing
Given a non-monotonic function h(x); one can pool certain types of sellers and reconstruct a new functionĤ(x) so that the buyers'valuation functionĤ(x) is continuous and weakly increasing, as shown in Figure 4 .
In the …rst region, since buyers' value is strictly increasing, the buyer-seller ratio function can be obtained as before. That is, (x) solves (5) with the initial condition This means that allocations are the same among this set of sellers, and buyers pay for the expected asset quality in this pool. Hence, by construction the free entry condition is satis…ed automatically in this pooling region.
In the last region, one can let (x) solve (5) with the initial condition (x b ) = (x a ), sincê H(x) is again strictly increasing (i.e., A1 holds). Hence, if (x b ) F B (x b ), (5) ensures that d dx < 0 and thus all previous results remain intact. Figure 7 illustrate this construction for the simple example with two types of holding cost.
More generally, if the underlying function h(x) has multiple non-monotonic regions, there are di¤erent ways to iron the underlying functions, and there may be multiple ironing intervals.
The logic is nevertheless the same. Let x i a and x i b denote the starting point and the ending point for the ith ironing interval. The ironed valuationĤ(x) can be used to construct an semi-pooling equilibrium as long as the following condition holds: Proof. Consider a direct mechanism fp (x); (x)g:
: Observe that the partial derivative of V with respect to x exists and has a …nite upper bound: V x (p; ; x) = 1 r+m( ) 1 r : Following the mechanism literature (see Milgrom and Segal (2002) ), the agent's utility must satisfy the envelope theorem (the integral condition) for any incentive-compatible mechanism:
This means that (IC) is the necessary condition for any IC contract. Furthermore, the function V (p; ; x) can then be rewritten as v(t; x) xt + (t); where t 1 r+m( ) and (t)
: Then, one can then easily see that v(t; x) satis…es the strict single crossing di¤erence property (SSCD). For any t 0 > t and x 0 > x:
According to the monotonic selection theorem ( See Theorem 4.1 in Milgrom (2004) ), v(t; x) satis…es the SSCD condition if and only if every optimal selection t (x) 2 arg max t v(t; x) is nondecreasing in x: Hence, t(x) = 1 r+m( (x)) has to be solved subject to the nondecreasing constraint. That is, the trading rate function ( ) has to be nonincreasing. Furthermore, from Theorem 4.2 (Milgrom (2004) ), given that v(t; x) is continuously di¤erentiable and satis…es SSCD, nondecreasing (x) and the envelope formulas (IC) are su¢ cient conditions for the achievable outcome.
It is useful to characterize the set of allocationsfp (x); (x)g which satisfy the free entry condition. To facilitate the rest of the proofs, I now introduce the following notation. Since the price must satisfy the free-entry condition for each market, given the buyer's valuation in a given market (denoted byh); sellers'utilities can be e¤ectively rewritten as a function of buyer-seller ratio and the buyer's valuationh: The expression is given by
That is, b V (x; ;h) denotes the utility of a type x seller when he enters the market with buyerseller ratio , given the expected value to buyersh: Given a concave matching function, one can show that, for any valueh; b V (x; ;h) is a concave function in : A seller's utility is therefore maximized when the buyer-seller ratio is chosen optimally.
denote the optimal level of buyer-seller ratio for any givenh:
Since b V (x; ;h) is strictly increasing in ; 8 2 [0; b F B (x;h)); and reaches its maximum 
4 6 One can also use this lemma to understand why the equilibrium must satisfy the tangency condition with complete information. In that case, x is observable andh = h(x): 4 7 In the case where p 0 < V (x); the function (p 0 ; x) = 1 becuase V (p 0 ; ; x) V (x) has no solution. In words, if the deviating price is lower than a type's equilibrium utility, this type will not come to this market. Proof. Proof by contradiction. Take a mechanism fp ( ); ( )g which satis…es Lemma 1 and free entry condition, while p(x) = b p for x 2 [x 1 ; x 2 ) X: That is, there exists a subset of sellers
x 2 [x 1 ; x 2 ) are in the same market (b p; b ): Buyers'expected value in this market is then given
Given that h(x) is strictly increasing (Assumption 1), a pooling equilibrium implies that H(b p) r < x 2 r : Given that type x 2 seller must be locally indi¤erent, and that D (V (x 2 ); x 2 ;h) is continuous inh; it follows that ( ) must jump downward and p( ) must jump upward at x 2 : Given that there is a jump in the price, a buyer can deviate by posting a 4 8 The only exception is when some types of sellers are out of the market. In this case, there then exists a marginal type x such that (x ) = 0 for 8x > x : For any x > x and p 0 > x r ; type-x will come to the market even when (p 0 ; x) ! 0. Hence, T (p 0 ) is then a set of these types of sellers. Nevertheless, such an exception is not relevant for the equilibrium result since a buyer will deviate even when he expects the worst type within this set, as will become clear later. new price p 0 = b p + ": By Lemma 2, he will attract the type-x 2 :
De…ne e (p; V ; x) as the buyer-seller ratio which ensures that the seller of type x stays on his indi¤erence curve, i.e., V (x; p; e (p; V ; x)) = V : Since e (p; V ; x) is continuous, there exists
m( e (p 0 ; V (x 2 ); x 2 )) p 0 > 0:
In words, by posting the price p 0 , buyers will attract x 2 and expect the buyer-seller ratio e (p 0 ; V (x 2 ); x 2 ): 
Consider a deviation p 0 = p(x L ) "; according to Lemma 2, T (p 0 ) = x L : That is, a buyer can open a new market with a lower price and expect the lowest type to come. Hence, by Lemma 7, such deviation is pro…table.
A.4.5 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Given fp (x); (x)g; one can see that the IR constraint holds for all sellers, since the trading price is higher than the outside option: p (x) > p F B (x) > x r : Furthermore, there is no pro…table deviation for buyers to open new markets, since any new market p 0 and its corresponding (p 0 ); given by (1) ; lead to a further distortion, implying a negative payo¤ for buyers. Formally, denote (p L ; p H ) as the lower bound and the upper bound, respectively, of the image of the function p (x). From Lemma 2, if buyers post a price p 0 > p H ; only the highest type will come to this market, and if they post a price p 0 < p L , only the lowest type will come to the market. In both cases, as shown in Lemma 7, the corresponding (p 0 ; (p 0 )) implies a negative payo¤ for buyers.
Note that one can easily see why a fully separating equilibrium cannot involve a jump in price. The buyer-seller ratio must be downward distorted and it is therefore given by (x) = D (V (x); x; h(x)): Since V (x) must be Lipschitz continuous in x; it follows immediately that (x) is continuous in x; and therefore so is the price function p (x) = h(x) r k (x) m( (x)) :Hence, the schedule fp (x); (x)g is the unique mechanism that satis…es both (E1) and (E2). In other words, the least-cost separating equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. given h x > 0. Hence, we know that (x) F B (x) for some x 1 > x L : Suppose now that (x) > F B (x) for some x: This implies that these two functions must cross at some point
and that the slope of the crossing point must satisfy the following inequality: Hence, the trading rate forx must be downward-distorted in order to prevent the types beloŵ r + m( (x))
The …rst inequality is given by (1) the monotonicity conditions ( (x 1 ) (x)) and (2)
is decreasing in when < F B (x 1 ; h(x)): The second inequality is given byĤ(x) >Ĥ(x 1 ):
This thus shows that the IC condition is violated. Note that this proof relies on the fact that
x is a strict local maximum. Otherwise, ifĤ(x ") =Ĥ(x); then (x) doesn't need to be downward-distorted.
A.4.8 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. One can easily see that the construction satis…es Lemma 1, which guarantees condition (E1). The trading rate in the pooling market is upward-distorted (i.e., q (x ) > F B (x )) so that the monotonicity condition (M) is satis…ed. Since the marginal type is indi¤erent between the pooling market and his …rst-best market, all seller types below the marginal type then strictly prefer the pooling market. Given that buyers'valuation is strictly increasing after the marginal type (h 0 (x) > 0 for 8x > x ); a separating market for each x > x can then be solved as before, which guarantees that both (E1) and the free-entry condition E2(a) are satis…ed for each x > x : Furthermore, the free-entry condition E2(a) holds for the pooling market by construction. Hence, the construction satis…es both E1 and the free-entry condition E2(a).
What is left to show is that E2(b) is satis…ed: In particular, notice that there is an upward jump in the equilibrium price at x from p q (x ) to p F B (x ): According to Lemma 2, a buyer will only attract the marginal type x if he posts a price p 0 2 (p F B (x ); p q (x )): Since the marginal type has already obtained his …rst-best utility, any price p 0 > p F B (x ) and its corresponding (p 0 ) necessarily generates distortion, and a buyer thus su¤ers from this additional distortion.
This can be seen clearly from Figure 5 . Furthermore, a buyer will not bene…t from lowering the price (p 0 = p q ") to attract x L ; since he cannot do better given condition (H2) : V (p q ; q ; x L ) V F B (x L ): 50 Evidently, for the same reason as in the baseline model, any price p 0 = p(x H ) + " is not pro…table since it attracts x H while resulting in more distortion. As a result, the scheme in Proposition 3 also satis…es E2(b): Therefore, it can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium outcome.
A.4.9 Existence for …re-sale equilibria
In the simple example, (s; c) are independently distributed and c 2 fc L ; c H g: Let F B (c) denote the optimal buyer-seller ratio when asset quality is observed. Note that, as shown in Equation
(2), the optimal ratio is only a function of the gain from trade c; but independent of s:
Claim 1 The above thus establishes that x is a …re-sale equilibrium. Let^ andĜ s (s) denote its underlying distribution that gives s. Fixing x ; any >^ and any distribution G s (s) that …rst-order stochastically dominatesĜ s (s) leads to a higher q(x ); which increases buyer-seller ratio in the pooling market. This is because q (x ) = U (V F B (x ); x ; q(x )) and U (V ; x;h) increases withh: Hence, under and G s (s); x satis…es all conditions for a …re sale equilibrium and q (x ) > F B (c H ):
A.4.10 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. From Equation (6) ; q (x ) is the upward distorted buyer-seller ratio when buyers' valuation is q(x ): That is, q (x ) = U (V F B (x ); x ; q(x )): Recall that U (V ; x;h) increases withh and q(x ) also increases with ; q (x ) must increase with and, consequently, p q (x ) must decrease with : As a result, a higher suggests more sellers enter the pooling price traded a at higher rate with a lower price, this thus leads to a higher aggregate volume and a lower aggregate price.
Without adverse selection (either = 0, or s is perfectly observable), all assets are then traded at the buyer-seller ratio F B (c); which only depends on the gains from trade (i.e., the distress position). The di¤erence in the aggregate volume compared to the benchmark is given by: Under perfect information, the price discount simply re ‡ects the di¤erence in the holding cost, which is given by
The di¤erence of the distress discount in a …re sale equilibrium vs. the perfect information case yields:
k (s; c L ) m( (s; c L )) :
The …rst term is pooling discount, which is positive for sellers with relatively high quality assets. The second term is positive when buyer-seller ratio is upward distorted so that q (x ) > F B (c H ): Recall that F B (s; c) is only a function of c; so this term is independent of s:The last term is always positive due to downward distorted buyer-seller ratio in the separating market, and is increasing in s. Hence, there existŝ such that p(s) p F B (s) > 0 for s >ŝ:
